A Study into the Forensic Recoverability of Data from 2nd Hand Blackberry Devices: World-Class Security, Foiled by Humans by Valli, Craig & Jones, Andrew
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
ECU Publications Pre. 2011 
2008 
A Study into the Forensic Recoverability of Data from 2nd Hand 
Blackberry Devices: World-Class Security, Foiled by Humans 
Craig Valli 
Edith Cowan University 
Andrew Jones 
Edith Cowan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of: Valli, C., & Jones, A. (2008). A Study into the Forensic Recoverability of 
Data from 2nd Hand Blackberry Devices: World-Class Security, Foiled by Humans. Proceedings of World Congress 
in Computer Science, Computer Engineering, and Applied Computing. (pp. 604-607). Monte Carlo Resort Las Vegas 
USA: CSREA Press. 
This Conference Proceeding is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks/849 
A Study into the Forensic Recoverability of Data from 2nd 
Hand Blackberry Devices: World-Class Security, Foiled 
by Humans  
 
C. Valli and A. Jones 
School of Computer and Information Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Mount Lawley WA, Australia 
 
Abstract – Blackberry RIM devices are arguably one of 
the more secure platforms for email, calendaring and 
voice. It is one of the few devices in this arena that has 
approval for carrying restricted security classifications. 
Blackberry devices do suffer from the same basic 
fundamental flaw in that they have a human operator. This 
research was about the blind purchase of Blackberry 
devices from auctions. Of the 15 Blackberry examined in 
this study 3 were able to be fully recovered. They all 
revealed personal and corporate details about the users of 
the devices. 
Keywords: Blackberry, forensic, remnant, privacy, 
recovery, exposure 
 
1 Introduction  
 The Blackberry as a device in its various guises is 
seen as the modern executive’s talisman of technology.  
The Blackberry device family was one of the initial 
innovators removing it from a simple digital diary into a 
fully mobile fully functional electronic office suite. The 
modern Blackberry device captures SMS, e-mail, 
appointments all with full multimedia enhancement and 
attachment a complete corporate compendium. 
 One of the main selling points for the Blackberry is 
its stringent security features.  It is one of the few Mobile 
devices that has approval for a lot a restricted security 
classifications from around the world including Canada, 
Australia, UK to name a few [1]. There is evidence to 
suggest that a Blackberry is a very secure device however, 
Blackberry has the same basic fundamental flaw it has a 
human operator. All of the best security measures in the 
world can still not account or mitigate against a human’s 
innate ability to do seemingly sensible tasks so very wrong. 
 This paper gives results of a study of 14 Blackberry 
devices purchased at various auction sites for sale. All of 
the Blackberry were subjected to forensic examination to 
extract information from them. Of the 14 examined 
Blackberry devices three of them were able to be fully 
recovered. 
2 Why Blackberry and not 3G? 
 The security of a Blackberry as mentioned before is 
one of the main selling points for these devices. The 
Blackberry is used as a telephony device, email, contact 
management and calendaring device by persons or 
institutions that want a “secure” means of interacting with 
stakeholders. The Blackberry as a device has a similar data 
footprint and capability as a modern 3G or WiFi phone. 
There is however, one important exception: Blackberry are 
typically used by corporate and government enterprises due 
to their security features and excellent corporate software. 
Of the 12 million subscribers to RIM services worldwide, 
over 8 million are corporate users [2]. This fact makes 
these types of devices a guaranteed 66% chance of 
potentially sourcing data from a corporate user that would 
presumably posess information that would have some value 
or purpose. This profile makes the Blackberry a target 
device for industrial spying, espionage or good old 
fashioned blackmail.  
 There is little argument that the Blackberry is a secure 
device but as mentioned previously people do silly things, 
such as leaving them unprotected or simply just misplace 
or lose the phone. Worldwide, the loss of phones either by 
theft or simple loss runs into the millions per annum, of 
which a percentage of these must be Blackberry. If this was 
not a problem then device location and protection tools 
such as Roblock, Findit, PhoneBAK [3] and Berry Locator 
[4] would not be produced or have a market. These 
software tools are produced to enable the ability to locate 
the phone via GPS, extract various types of data or disable 
and produce an audible alarm on the phone. That people or 
organisations are purchasing and sustaining development 
of these products at least confirms that someone is 
ascribing a value to the information stored on the device. 
Blackberry are desirable and expensive making them a 
viable theft for profit vector, it is argued that the erasure 
function may actually enable this. This could be partially 
due to the nexus created by the Blackberry erasure mode 
which ensures that the device is wiped after 10 
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unsuccessful login attempts i.e. there is no possible trace 
back to the original owner.   
3 Forensic Analysis and Results  
 There is not currently a wide range of tools or 
literature commonly available to assist in the acquisition 
and forensic analysis of Blackberry Rim devices [5-7]. This 
is due in part to the corporate manageability of the 
Blackberry through the software tools available for 
managing Blackberry. This is in direct contrast to mobile 
phone forensics that has a growing selection of tools and 
an expanding literature. Therefore, the one tool that was 
used for this examination was Paraben Device Seizure 2.0. 
 The 15 Blackberry devices were purchased at auction 
in random manner as possible. The Blackberry were then 
charged and then simply turned on attached to a IBM 
laptop computer running Windows XP and Paraben Device 
Seizure 2.0 and attempts were made to acquire data from 
them. The Blackberry devices that asked for a password to 
be entered had default known passwords and if these were 
not successful they have been powered off. The author 
intends to try physical attacks against the devices to 
recover the data. None of the Blackberry devices in this 
study contained SIM cards. 
 The successfully acquired devices were then analysed 
using the capabilities of Paraben Device Seizure. Based 
profile evidence is able to be retrieved as a result of the 
analysis. This includes the telecommunications provider, 
the phone call logs, address books, calendars, any SMS and 
any emails, sent these all help build a profile of the user.  
 There are also specific settings that relate to the 
Blackberry device level of use and activation itself. These 
include the services used and also any applications 
installed that drive these. In addition there may be records 
of any extra installed or downloaded Blackberry 
applications. So in the case of a user there is an ability to 
rapidly profile an individual. 
 The following are vignettes of the cases that were 
able to be recovered from the three Blackberry. 
3.1 Case 1 – Superannuation and Insurance 
 Apart from the name of the owner, his addresses and 
contact details. This case was a regional manager in New 
South Wales and Australian Capital Territory for a large 
superannuation entity. He was a Gold Flyer in an airline 
loyalty program the membership ID was recovered. From 
his address book apart from his business interests he had 
significant connection with the fishing industry which was 
further confirmed by a Google search. The device 
contained emails details of board meetings, meeting 
accommodation details, applications for the post of office 
manager, and comments on the suitability of the named and 
identified applicants. 
3.2 Case 2 – Superannuation and Insurance 
 It was possible to extract the name of the owner, his 
addresses and various contact details. This case was a 
regional manager in Victoria and South Australia for the 
same large superannuation entity as Case 1. It should be 
noted that during the purchasing of these devices there 
were no multiple purchases of the Blackberry devices. 
Upon checking back on receipts the authors did purchase 
from one vendor twice but 23 days apart. There were no 
asset ids or markings to suggest that they were from the 
same entity. 
Apart from his extensive calendaring of events, this user 
was also tracing his family tree. In addition either he or 
some he knew was interested in guitar as he had recently 
downloaded chords. The device contained emails related to 
the farming community, a medical appointment, meetings, 
a bereavement, performance reviews and also contained 19 
names and addresses and call history. 
 
3.3 Case 3 – Business 
 This user was a person involved in several business 
enterprises who was domiciled in an expensive part of 
Sydney. Apart from a full disclosure of name, address and 
contact details there were numerous emails relating to the 
various businesses this person was interacting with. The 
information found on the device potentially had some value 
as it specified limits and also conditions of various bids and 
contracts that were being negotiated. There were also 
comments and correspondence about various employees 
and associated problems some of which would not have 
been construed as complimentary if revealed. Likewise 
there were flight details and airline loyalty details that were 
able to be extracted from the emails.  
 There was a potential also for blackmail with some of the 
lurid and extensive exchanges between the user and his 
mistress. There was also an extensive list of contacts 200 
plus and phone logs for the device in question that would 
allow mapping of interactions. The calendar was also 
likewise well documented with complete scheduling of all 
aspects of the persons life. This would have allowed a 
complete reconstruction of activities undertaken over the 
period. 
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4 Implications of Investigation 
 The three cases have uncovered significant personal 
details about each of the persons who were users of the 
devices. While two of the devices did not contain a 
significant volume of information, they both originated in 
the financial sector and both contained details of a personal 
nature of the owner and other individuals that would have 
caused embarrassment or distress if it had become publicly 
known.  The implications of the information on these 
devices becoming available to individuals who might make 
use of it for a range of illicit activities could potentially, 
have devastating consequences for an organisation or an 
individual.  The potential cost of these data losses, both in 
financial terms and to the reputation of the organisation or 
the individual, could be high and it is clear that additional 
effort needs to be expended to ensure that this information 
is protected. 
 The following are an outline of some methods of 
criminal or malicious activity that could be perpetrated on 
the individuals in these cases. 
4.1 Identity Theft 
 All of the devices would enable identity theft of the 
previous user of the device. There is sufficient information 
in all cases to have the basis for solid engineering of 
identity theft. US research estimates of the number of 
people that have suffered some form of identity theft as 
high as 10 Million people and the cost to business and 
consumers at approximately $53 billion in the USA alone 
in 2002. In Australia recently there are moves to create 
laws that specifically prosecute identity theft [8]. Much of 
this is still largely not costed and speculative; evidence for 
this is that the figure of approximately $1 billion has been 
bandied about in Australia over a number of years in 
various guises [8-10]. 
 Identity theft does not always have to have an 
immediate financial profit motive; there are other 
manifestations of malfeasance as a result of identity theft. 
In Case 1 and 3 there was significant personal data left on 
the device that could allow a malicious individual to 
manipulate and change schedules or flights for instance. 
The person was a member of the particular airline loyalty 
program which allows members to change seat allocations 
for flights on-line. So an interceding party could wait for 
Case 1 and 3 to select seats before check-in and then 
change the seat allocation immediately after this. The 
service also allows you to request special meals from 
diabetic to vegan, and make other special requests through 
the web. These annoyances while not in of themselves 
catastrophic acts could cause the user considerable angst, 
stress and delay in ones busy life. 
 
4.2 Industrial Espionage 
 All cases revealed contact details for each individual 
in Case 3 this was extensive contacts in excess of 200. Two 
of the cases had information that could be embarrassing at 
best and litigious at worst should the information have 
become known. Also in Case 3 in a particular timely 
interception of some information in the emails could have 
had significant financial consequences. 
 In combination with call records and other 
communications it would be a possibility to create a social 
and business network for each user.  Having mapped their 
interactions then one could then start a perception 
management campaign subtly casting doubt on the user of 
the device in a variety of vectors gleaned from their call 
records and emails. 
4.3 Blackmail 
 Yes good old fashioned blackmail Case 3 was a man 
of means by his address in one of the more expensive 
neighbourhoods of Sydney, his business class flights and 
his outside of business hours associations. Case 3 however, 
was not a matter of all work and no play he kept a mistress. 
  Which from the content of two emails indicating a 
timetabling clash with subsequent email to readjust 
schedules did indicate the wife did not know of the others 
existence. This case in particular was potentially a very 
fertile ground for blackmail and extortion.  
4.4 Stalking and Harassment 
 In all of the cases the devices yielded sufficient 
information to allow an individual to stalk or harass the 
user both in physical and cyber realms. All three people 
held positions of power and authority over personnel and 
customers, anyone of these people could have had a want 
to stalk or harass the users of these devices. This type of 
activity would have an increased probability should the 
mistress in Case 3 need to seek revenge or retribution 
should she become obsolete.  
5 Conclusion 
 Companies and individuals use these Blackberry devices 
as they are demonstrably very secure when used properly. 
The loss of hand held devices that still contain significant 
amounts of information is not a new problem. Every year 
in Australia over 200,000 mobile phones are lost or stolen 
[11]. In the year 2005-06 it was reported that around 
800.000 mobile phones were stolen in the UK [12].  These 
are not insignificant numbers and percentage of these 
would be Blackberry devices that would contain 
information.  
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Case 1 and 2 would indicate that the Blackberry in 
question had been supplied to a disposal company or may 
have been simply traded in. There needs to be some onus 
placed on the “disposal” companies to ensure that devices 
are adequately erased before resale this is best acquitted by 
enforcement of a contract. Current law in Australia sees no 
real applicable laws, however if these devices were UK 
based under the data protection laws in that country the 
owners could have been prosecuted. 
It is also noteworthy that despite the availability of 
encryption as a set up option on the Blackberry device, 
three devices surveyed had not had this security feature 
enabled nor were they password protected. The work 
undertaken here also further confirms the need to make 
sure that sound end-user education is in place. An even 
basic security concept such as the need for passwords has 
been lost in these 3 cases. The use of passwords while 
sometimes inconvenient is still a valid security measure. 
The enablement of available encryption would have made 
the devices very secure.  
Assuming that these devices were not stolen this initial 
research has uncovered what appears to be a significant 
and culpable failure to take adequate steps to protect the 
data on these devices that are capable of very strong 
security. As a result these devices could have resulted in a 
number secrets and sensitive information being revealed. 
The end result of which could have been significant 
criminal activity being perpetrated against the owners of 
the devices.  
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